The Macroeconomics of the labor market : three fundamental views by Karanassou, Marika et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DOCUMENT DE TREBALL 
 
CREAP2006-15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE MACROECONOMICS OF THE LABOR MARKET: 
THREE FUNDAMENTAL VIEWS 
Marika Karanassou; Hector Sala  
and Dennis J. Snower 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
THE MACROECONOMICS OF THE LABOR MARKET: 
THREE FUNDAMENTAL VIEWS* 
 
 
Marika Karanassou†; Hector Sala‡ 
and Dennis J. Snower§ 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
We distinguish and assess three fundamental views of the labor market regarding the 
movements in unempoyment: (i) the frictionless equilibrium view; (ii) the chain reaction 
theory, or prolonged adjustment view; and (iii) the hysteresis view. While the frictionless 
view implies a clear compartmentalization between the short- and long-run, the hysteresis 
view implies that all the short-run fluctuations automatically turn into long-run changes in 
the unemployment rate. We assert the problems faced by these conceptions in explaining 
the diversity of labor market experiences across the OECD labor markets. We argue that 
the prolonged adjustment view can overcome these problems since it implies that the 
short, medium, and long runs are interrelated, merging with one another along an 
intertemporal continuum. 
 
 
Key Words: Unemployment, interactive labor market dynamics, interplay of 
lags and shocks, frictional growth, growth drivers. 
 
JEL Classification Numbers: E22, E24, J21, J30. 
 
                                                 
* Acknowledgments: Hector Sala is grateful to the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science for 
financial support through grant SEJ2006-14849/ECON.  
† Department of Economics, Queen Mary, University of London and IZA, Mile End Road, London 
E1 4NS, UK. tel.: + (0)20 7882-5090; email: M.Karanassou@qmul.ac.uk  
‡ Department d’Economia Aplicada, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and IZA, 08193 Bellaterra, 
Spain; tel: + 34 93 5812779; email: hector.sala@uab.es  
§ President Institute for World Economics, University of Kiel, CEPR and IZA, Dusternbrooker Weg 
120, 24105 Kiel, Germany; tel: +49 431 8814 235; email: d.snower@ifw-kiel.de ; http://www.uni-
kiel.de/snower/  
                                    CREAP2006-15
1 Introduction
This paper is concerned with one of the most important questions in the macroeco-
nomics of labor markets: How are movements in employment and unemployment to be
interpretted? Over the past forty years, different areas of the OECD have experienced
strikingly different changes in employment and unemployment. How can we account
for these differing experiences? A lot hinges on our interpretation of the events.
A wide variety of explanations have been proposed for the observed movements in
employment and unemployment: the natural rate hypothesis, the NAIRU, real business
cycles, the Keynesian deficient demand hypothesis, union theories, bargaining models,
efficiency wage theories, insider-outsider theories, search and matching theories. This
paper distinguishes three fundamental economic views with very different implications
for our conceptual understanding, predictions of labor market and macroeconomic ac-
tivities, and policy advice.
• First the frictionless equilibrium view,1 according to which the labor market ad-
justs quickly to external shocks (such as shocks to productivity, product demand,
raw material prices, or interest rates) and thus this market spends most of the
time at or near its frictionless equilibrium position, i.e. the position it would
occupy in the absence of any labor market adjustments. This view of the labor
market is manifested in static multi-equation models, where labor market adjust-
ments are ignored, or dynamic single-equation unemployment rate models, where
all adjustments are suppressed into the autoregressive coefficients of the unem-
ployment equation. The frictionless equilibrium labor market models predict that
unemployment evolves around its natural rate, and thus conform with the natural
rate of unemployment (NRU) hypothesis.
• Second the prolonged adjustment view, or chain reaction theory (CRT) of unem-
ployment,2 in which the labor market adjusts only slowly to external shocks. The
reason is that many labor market decisions are subject to adjustment costs, such
as costs of employment adjustment, wage staggering, price stickiness, or labor
force participation adjustment. Consequently, current decisions may depend on
past labor market outcomes.
This view of the labor market is manifested in interactive dynamics models, i.e.
1Prominent developments within this view are those that focus on the role of shocks and institutions
(see, among others, Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991, and Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000), on the
Structuralist Theory of Unemployment (see, for example, Phelps, 1994, and Phelps and Zoega, 2001),
or have a purely institutionalist focus (e.g., Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel, 2005). See Blanchard (2006)
for a review and an appraisal of this literature.
2The CRT was developed by Karanassou and Snower (1996, 1997 and 1998). See also Karanassou,
Sala and Snower (2003, 2004 and 2006).
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dynamic multi-equation systems with spillover effects. In CRT models external
shocks may have prolonged after-effects due to the lagged labor market adjustment
processes, and so unemployment can be away - possibly far away - from its natural
rate for substantial time spans. In this case the frictionless equilibrium view is an
unsatisfactory approximation of labor market activity.
Furthermore, when the exogenous variables have nonzero long-run growth rates
(e.g., capital accumulation, population growth) unemployment does not gravitate
towards its natural rate due to frictional growth, a phenomenon that encapsulates
the interplay of lagged endogenous variables (frictions) and growing exogenous
variables (growth drivers). It can be shown that in CRT models the long-run
unemployment rate is given by the sum of two components: the natural rate and
frictional growth. Clearly, frictional growth is zero in static models (due to zero
lags) and in single-equation unemployment rate models (due to zero growth as
the exogenous variables are trendless).
• Third the hysteresis view,3 according to which all the short-run fluctuations auto-
matically turn into long-run changes in the unemployment rate. Thus unemploy-
ment tends to get stuck at wherever it happens to be currently, and transitory
business cycle fluctuations lead to permanent changes in the unemployment rate.
Here the long-run equilibrium is indistinguishable from the cyclical fluctuations.
We can thus argue that the distinction among the three views derives from their
treatment of the short-run and long-run states of the labor market. In the frictionless
equilibrium (NRU) models, the short-run and long-run are compartmentalized. In the
prolonged adjustment (CRT) models, the short-run and long-run are interrelated due to
frictional growth. In the hysteresis models, the short-run translates into the long-run
due to the permanent effect of temporary shocks. This is in contrast with both the
natural rate and chain reaction views in which temporary shocks dissipate with the
passage of time.
Within the frictionless equilibrium view, the models of labor market equilibrium are
diverse. In market-clearing models, for example, the labor market equilibrium lies at
the intersection between the labor demand and supply curves; whereas in models of
non-clearing labor markets, the equilibrium is off the labor supply curve, so that there
is involuntary unemployment. But what all these models have in common is the pre-
sumption that labor market activity is usually not far from its frictionless equilibrium.
In this equilibrium, the decisions of different agents are consistent with one another.
For instance, the employment decisions made by firms under the prevailing wages are
3See the influential contribution of Blanchard and Summers (1986), and Raurich, Sala and Sorolla
(2006) for a recent work in this area.
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consistent with the wage decisions made by the wage negotiators under the prevailing
employment levels.
According to this approach, movements in employment and unemployment are
therefore to be explained in terms of shifts in the underlying frictionless equilibrium.
Such shifts could be caused by shifts in labor demand (e.g. due to productivity shocks),
labor supply (e.g. due to changes in participation rates), or wage setting (e.g. due to
changes in union power).
Within the prolonged adjustment view, the models of labor market adjustment
processes are diverse as well, as are the costs of adjustment. A key element that these
various models have in common is the presumption that current labor market activity
is conditioned by what has happened in the past, and that the process of adjustment
may take a long time to work itself out.
In this view, movements in employment and unemployment are the outcome of
the interplay between external shocks and lagged adjustment processes. The external
shocks can, and generally do, of course affect the long-term equilibrium; but that is not
their only influence on the labor market. Temporary shocks - such as temporary oil
price hikes, or exchange rate fluctuations - can have persistent effects on employment
and unemployment. Permanent shocks - such as productivity increases, or rises in the
working-age population - may not manifest themselves fully right away, but may require
substantial time before their long-run effects are present.
Figuratively speaking, each labor market shock leads to a wave of labor market
effects, flowing through time. In practice, however, we are never able to observe any
such wave in isolation. That would be possible only if, after the occurrence of a each
shock, nothing happened to the labor market until all the after-effects of the shock
had worked themselves out. But labor market shocks are not isolated events; they
occur all the time, in rapid succession, month after month, year after year. So long
before any shock has had a chance to work itself out through time, another shock
occurs, carrying another wave of labor market effects. Consequently, in this view, the
movements of employment and unemployment may be understood as the cumulation
of waves, released by the succession of shocks.
The hysteresis view should be seen as more than just an extreme case of prolonged
adjustment. In contrast to the frictionless equilibrium and prolonged adjustment views,
it makes no distinction between the short-run and long-run. The frictionless equilibrium
view, the distinction is sharp, as in basic micro theory: in the short run, the labor
market adjusts to the given technology, the capital stock, and the number of firms; in
the long run, the technology and the capital stock may change, and the labor market
adjusts to these changes as well. In the prolonged adjustment view, the distinction
is blurred, since labor is no longer considered a purely variable factor. Due to costs
4
                                    CREAP2006-15
of adjustment in the labor market, labor becomes similar to capital; both are difficult
to vary instantaneously. Both tend to move gradually with the passage time. Just
as the movements of the capital stock reflect the additions in the form of investment
and the subtractions in the form of depreciation and obsolescence, so the movements
in employment reflect the additions in the form of hiring and the subtractions in the
form of firing and quits. In this context, the difference between the short- and long-run
is a difference in degree rather than kind. In the hysteresis view, by contrast, there is
no distinction at all between short- and long-run, since each short-run is the long-run.
The observation that labor market adjustment costs make labor analogous to capital
should not, however, lead us to believe that the associated labor market analysis will be
equivalent to the analysis of physical capital. The reason is that the adjustment costs
for physical capital are quite limited (costs of investment, depreciation, and obsoles-
cence), whereas the adjustment costs for labor are diverse and the associated, diverse
adjustment processes interact with one another.
The hysteresis view (on the one hand) can only explain the changes in unemployment
over time, while the frictionless equilibrium and prolonged adjustment views (on the
other) can explain the evolution of unemployment. Nevertheless, the frictionless equi-
librium and prolonged adjustment views are mutually exclusive. Clearly, the short-run
and long-run states of labor market activity are either compartmentalized, or not.
The NRU and CRT models of the frictionless equilibrium and prolonged adjustment
views, respectively, have quite different policy implications. The former focuses atten-
tion on policies that affect the long-term structure of the labor market, i.e. the labor
demands and supplies once the adjustment processes have been completed. From this
vantage point, various authors have suggested that European unemployment could be
reduced through declines in taxes on employers and employees, in real interest rates,
and in the duration and generosity of unemployment benefits. The prolonged adjust-
ment view, by contrast, stresses the importance of the interaction between the lagged
adjustment processes and growth drivers in determining the trajectory of the unemploy-
ment rate. For example, policies promoting R&D to increase productivity, or policies
that shift upward the time path of capital stock can reduce unemployment.4
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we outline the
problems faced by the mainstream accounts of the labor market performance in the
OECD countries, and explain the insights brought by the prolonged adjustment view.
In Section 3 we present the frictionless equilibrium view. This establishes the frame-
work whereby, in Section 4, we explain the prolonged adjustment and hysteresis views.
Section 5 concludes.
4See Henry, Karanassou and Snower (2000), Karanassou and Snower (2004), Bande and Karanassou
(2006), and Karanassou, Sala and Salvador (2006).
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2 The Pitfalls of the Conventional Views
2.1 The Diversity of Experience
Over the past forty years, different areas of the OECD have experienced strikingly
different changes in employment and unemployment. Table 1 illustrates the diversity
by contrasting the European Union (EU)5 and the US.
Employment in the US has risen much more rapidly than in the EU. Between 1970
and 1990 American employment increased by more than 40 million, almost three times
as much as the European. In the 1990s it rose by 18 million in the US and 16 in the EU,
but 7.5 million of the latter were due to the German unification. Employment growth
rates in the EU have reached similar values than the US only after the end of the US
roaring nineties: they were below 1% in both areas in 2000-2005.
It is of course also true that the labor force has grown faster in the US than in
the EU. Thus some of the extra employment creation in the US just absorbed the
extra people looking for work. But that cannot be the whole story. Labor demand
does not simply rise to meet the increasing labor supply. If that were the case, then
unemployment would remain constant. As we can see, however, the EU unemployment
rate has edged upwards relentlessly over the last decades -2.4% in 1970, 5.3% in 1980,
7.2% in 1990, 7.6% in 2000 and 7.9% in 2005-, whereas the US unemployment rate has
remained roughly unchanged on average -around 5.0%, with the exceptional peak in
the aftermath of the oil price shocks-.
Table 1: The diversity of labor market experiences: US vs. EU.
Levels Differences
1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 1970-80 1980-90 2000-1990 2005-2000
LUS 82.8 107.0 125.9 142.6 149.3 24.2 18.9 16.7 6.7
NUS 78.7 99.3 118.8 136.9 141.7 20.6 19.5 18.1 4.8
UUS 4.1 7.7 7.1 5.7 7.6 3.5 -0.6 -1.4 1.9
uUS 5.0 7.2 5.6 4.0 5.1 2.2 -1.6 -1.6 1.1
LEU 136.0 145.9 158.8 177.0 185.4 9.9 12.9 18.2 8.4
NEU 132.8 138.2 147.3 163.6 170.9 5.4 9.1 16.4 7.2
UEU 3.3 7.7 11.5 13.4 14.6 4.5 3.8 1.9 1.2
uEU 2.4 5.3 7.2 7.6 7.9 2.9 1.9 0.3 0.3
Note: Labor force (L), employment (N) and unemployment (U) expressed in millions;
unemployment rate (u) expressed in percentage points.
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook no 79.
5The EU comprises the following 15 countries: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Finland,
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK.
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Within the EU, there is yet more diversity. As shown in table 2, some countries
have recently experienced significant declines in unemployment rates. For example,
from 7.2% in 1990 to 4.8% in 2005 in Denmark, from 13.1% to 4.4% in Ireland, from
5.4% to 5.0% in the Netherlands, from 12.1% to 9.2% in Spain, and from 7.1% to 4.8%
in the UK. Others, in contrast, have not: the rate of unemployment in France has risen
from 8.9% in 1990 to 9.9% in 2005, in Germany6 it has doubled from 4.5% to 9.1%,
whereas in Italy it rose until the end of the 1990s and has mildly decreased afterwards.
Table 2: The diversity of labor market experiences within the EU.
u ∆N
1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 1970-80 1980-90 1990-00 00-05
Denmark 1.0 5.3 7.2 4.3 4.8 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.0
Ireland 6.0 7.5 13.1 4.3 4.4 0.9 0.1 3.7 2.9
Netherlands 0.8 3.7 5.4 2.8 5.0 0.7 1.1 1.9 0.0
Spain 2.4 9.3 12.1 10.8 9.2 -0.4 0.9 1.9 4.0
UK 3.5 6.8 7.1 5.5 4.8 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.9
France 2.6 6.5 8.9 9.4 9.9 0.5 0.3 0.8 0.5
Germany 0.4 1.7 4.5 6.9 9.1 0.3 1.0 0.2 -0.2
Italy 4.0 5.6 9.1 10.2 7.8 0.7 0.1 -0.1 1.3
Note: u expressed in percentage points, ∆N in growth rates,.
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook no 79.
The countries that have been successful at pushing unemployment down have gen-
erally done so through relatively strong growth of employment. In other words, their
decline in unemployment appears to have been a genuine achievement, rather than
testimony to new ways of hiding unemployment (e.g. by using government training
programs to remove people from the unemployment statistics). Furthermore, the un-
employment drop has been generally achieved without any disproportionate increase
in inflation. On the contrary, employment has grown at low rates in France, Italy and
Germany. In France employment rose by just 3.0 million employees in 25 years (from
21.8 million in 1980 to 24.8 in 2005); in Italy it hardly grew in the 1980s and 1990s
(20.7 millions in 1980, 20.9 in 2000); in the unified Germany it went from 38.1 million
in 1991 to 38.8 in 2005.
6Before 1991 these data correspond to Western Germany; 1991 onwards to the unified
Germany. The annual growth rate of unemployment in the 1990s corresponds to period 1992-
2000.
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2.2 Problems with Compartmentalization
How can we account for these differing experiences? A lot hinges on our interpretation of
the events - not only our understanding of labor market activity, but also our approach
to labor market policy.
Current macroeconomic theory, in its standard, mainstream expositions,7 is thor-
oughly compartmentalized: the short run deals with business cycles and the long run
deals with growth. This compartmentalization has been part of the conventional wis-
dom of macroeconomics for the past fifty years at least. Its beginnings, arguably, are
to be found in Samuelson’s “neoclassical synthesis,” which distinguishes between the
short-run business fluctuations that were the focus of much macroeconomic analysis at
the time, and the market-clearing equilibrium that was the context of most microeco-
nomic analysis. The implicit assumption underlying this compartmentalization is that
market frictions, generated by costs of price and quantity adjustment, apply only to
the “short-run,” and thus their implications - non-clearing markets, imperfect adjust-
ment of employment and production to shocks, etc. - are short-run phenomena as well.
They do not apply to the “long-run,” the time span relevant for the analysis of capital
accumulation, technological change, and other aspects of economic growth.
Applied to labor markets, this compartmentalization encourages the belief that un-
employment may be decomposed into two components: a long-run equilibrium rate and
short-run variations around it. The long-run equilibrium rate is often called “structural”
and the short-run variations are denoted as “cyclical,” and these two components are
regarded as largely independent of one another. This approach is often identified with
the natural rate theory, which - in most of its conventional formulations - regards move-
ments in unemployment as fluctuations around a reasonably stable natural rate.
At first sight, this compartmentalization of unemployment into a structural (natural
rate) component and a cyclical component appears to fit the US experience well. As well
known, the US unemployment rate has been trendless over the past four decades, and
the temporary episodes of high unemployment (in the mid-1970s, early 1980s, and early
1990s) have coincided with major international recessions. Thus it seems reasonable
to suppose, as a first approximation, that the US structural unemployment rate has
remained essentially stable, somewhere between 5% and 6%, and that the fluctuations
of unemployment around this level were cyclical in nature.
The compartmentalization hypothesis also appears to fit the European experience
in the 1950s and 1960s quite well. Once again, the picture is one of a stable, low long-
run unemployment rate interrupted by temporary blips, associated with recessions.
European unemployment begun to drift upwards in the 1970s, but even then the com-
partmentalization story can be given some plausibility. After all, in that decade many
7See, for example, the textbooks by Blanchard and Fischer (1989) and Romer (2006).
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European countries experienced some significant changes in the structure of their labor
markets. Union power was increasing, both in terms of union density and the coverage
of union wage agreements. Unions helped push up wages, thereby may have discour-
aged employment. The proportion of women and young people in the labor force rose,
as it became increasingly acceptable for women to work and the postwar baby boom
generation came of working age. These groups are associated with higher unemploy-
ment rates than the prime-age males. Job security legislation became more stringent
in many European countries, giving established employees more market power to drive
up their wages. Unemployment benefits and other welfare state entitlement became
increasingly generous, making it less onerous for people to remain unemployed. For
all these reasons, it could be argued that the structural unemployment rate in Europe
must have risen in 1970s. So although the steep rise in the EU unemployment rate in
the mid-1970s was certainly associated with the recession at that time, the rest of the
upward drift in unemployment could well have been structural.
But the further climb of European during the 1980s and 90s has been unkind to the
compartmentalization hypothesis. In the beginning of the 1980s Europe was in reces-
sion, but even though the recession ended in mid-1982, the European unemployment
rate kept rising till 1986, before plateauing at a level that was about twice as high as in
1980. It was not until 1989 that the unemployment rate started to fall significantly, and
by 1991, in response to another recession, it rose again. This recession ended in 1992,
but the European unemployment rate continued to rise until 1994, before plateauing at
level that was more than two percentage points higher than the previous peak of the
1980s. This relentless upward ratchet is difficult to square with the compartmental-
ization story. Oswald (1998, p. 1) points out that "despite conventional wisdom, high
unemployment does not appear to be primarily the result of things like overly generous
benefits, trade union power, taxes, or wage ‘inflexibility’."
Given that inflation rates were low and stable over much of the 1980s and 90s, the
long climb of European unemployment clearly cannot be explained in terms of tempo-
rary errors in inflation expectations, intertemporal substitution of leisure for labor, or
cyclical swings. True, cyclical downturns initiate each step in the ratchet - the prolonged
increases in European unemployment in the 1970s, 80s, and 90s were each initiated by
a recession - but what is difficult to explain is why unemployment kept rising and re-
mained high for so long after the recessions were over. If the compartmentalization
story is to work, we must argue that most of the upward movement in unemployment
during the 1980s and 90s - like that of the 1970s - must have been due to increases in
the structural unemployment rate. The difficulty is to figure out where these structural
increases came from. In most European countries, the period since the early 1980s has
been characterized by deregulation, privatization, decline in union density, and partial
9
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dismantling of job protection. Under these circumstances one would have expected the
structural unemployment to have fallen, if anything. On the other hand, rising interest
rates, tax rates, and unemployment benefits,8 may all have played a role in driving the
European NRU upwards, but the timing of these factors does not always mesh well
with the timing of the unemployment increases.9 According to Blanchard and Wolfers
(2000, p. C2), "Explanations (of high unemployment) based solely on institutions also
run however into a major empirical problem: many of these institutions were already
present when unemployment was low... Thus, while labour market institutions can
potentially explain cross country differences today, they do not appear able to explain
the general evolution of unemployment over time."
On this account, a growing number of economists, commentators, and policy mak-
ers have suggested that the cyclical and structural components of unemployment are
interdependent - so interdependent, in fact, as to make their interactions more sig-
nificant than the distinction between them. The oft-quoted observation that cyclical
unemployment in Europe “turns into” structural unemployment is a reflection of this
idea.
In that event, however, the compartmentalization hypothesis breaks down. The
sharp distinction between a “short run” and a “long run” prevalent in the unemployment
literature cannot be maintained. Instead, we must turn to the hysteresis view, where
the short and long runs are identical, or to the prolonged adjustment view, where the
short, medium, and long runs are intimately interrelated, merging with one another
along an intertemporal continuum.
2.3 Problems with Hysteresis
In the hysteresis view, there is no compartmentalization between cyclical and structural
unemployment at all. Every cyclical fluctuation becomes engraved in stone.
One difficulty with this theory is that hysteresis combined with random labor market
shocks implies that unemployment follows a random walk, so that the unemployment
rate hits 0 or 100 percent with certainty within a finite time period. As an empirical
fact, however, unemployment rates tend to remain within a relatively narrow band,
lying approximately between 2% and 15%.
Another difficulty is that while temporary labor market shocks (such as temporary
increases in oil prices or interest rates) lead to permanent increases in the unemploy-
8See, for example, Phelps (1994) and Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991) for explanations along
these lines.
9For instance, the major rises in European unemployment benefits occurred predominantly in the
1960s and early 1970s, and thus extremely long and powerful lagged responses are necessary to explain
the rising unemployment since the 1980s on this basis. See, for example, Grubb (1994) and Lindbeck
(1994).
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ment rate, permanent shocks (such as a productivity rise or an increase in the working
age population) make the unemployment rate explode. The reason is that each per-
manent shock is equivalent to an unending sequence of temporary shocks, all in the
same direction. Thus a permanent increase in labor demand (due, say, to a perma-
nent productivity rise) is the same as an unending succession of temporary increases
in labor demand, of equal magnitude. So if each temporary increase in labor demand
leads to a permanent fall in unemployment, then a permanent labor demand rise must
cause unemployment to fall without limit (until it reaches zero). Similarly, a permanent
shock in the opposite direction must cause unemployment to rise without limit (until
it reaches 100 percent). But of course neither of these alternative predicted patterns is
ever encountered in practice.
Thus it is scarcely surprising that the hysteresis literature focuses exclusively on
temporary shocks and ignores permanent shocks.
2.4 Insights with Prolonged Adjustments
The prolonged adjustment perspective overcomes the pitfalls of the conventional views.
It is an interactive dynamics approach with the following salient features.
First, it relies on dynamic multi-equation systems with spillover effects to analyze
the trajectory of the unemployment rate. This is in contrast with some prominent con-
tributions of the frictionless equilibrium view (Blanchard andWolfers, 2000, and Nickell,
Nunziata and Ochel, 2005) that rely on the estimation of single-equation unemployment
rate models. In the context of autoregressive multi-equation models, movements in un-
employment can be viewed as "chain reactions" of responses to labor market shocks -
hence the epithet ‘Chain Reaction Theory’ of this approach - working their way through
systems of interacting lagged adjustment processes.10 These labor market frictions make
current decision variables of labor market participants depend both on past and future
labor market conditions. In the simple model below we focus on the role of training
costs. It is also important to note that the various lagged adjustment processes interact
with one another and these interactions entail the need of analyzing them as a system.11
Second, it recognizes the diverse dynamic features of economic disturbances and ex-
plicitly distinguishes between temporary and permanent shocks: the concepts of unem-
ployment persistence and unemployment responsiveness, explained below, are defined
10Labor market adjustment processes are diverse and with well-known microfoundations from the
theoretical literature. There are, for example, (i) employment adjustments effects (see Nickell, 1978,
Berndt and Fuss, 1986, and Lindbeck and Snower, 1988); (ii) insider membership effects (see Blanchard
and Summers, 1986, and Lindbeck and Snower, 1987a, 1987b); (iii) wage/price staggering (see Taylor,
1979, 1980); (iv) unemployment adjustment effects (see Layard and Bean, 1989); and (v) labor force
adjustment effects (see French, 2005, and Flodén, 2006).
11In fact they may well be complementary (so that their joint effects are stronger than the sum of
their individual effects) or substitutable (so that their joint effects are weaker).
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to measure the after-effects of such diverse shocks. For a given system of adjustment
processes, shocks with different dynamic features have nontrivial different dynamic im-
plications. Note that, by default, the frictionless equilibrium and hysteresis approaches
focus exclusively on temporary shocks.
Third, in contrast to the frictionless equilibrium and hysteresis approaches, the chain
reaction approach focuses explicitly on frictional growth. In the presence of economic
growth in the labor market - technological change and capital accumulation leading to
a steady rise in labor demand and population growth leading to a steady rise in labor
supply - the adjustment processes never have a chance to work themselves out entirely.
Employment and unemployment are continually chasing after their moving, frictionless
targets, but since the adjustment processes never work themselves out entirely, the fric-
tionless targets are never reached. This is important because, under frictional growth,
the steady state levels of labor market activities are determined through the interaction
between economic growth and the adjustment processes. In particular, the equilibrium
levels of employment and unemployment depend on how far these levels keep lagging
behind their moving (frictionless) targets. As a consequence, the NRU is not a reference
point for actual unemployment in models with frictional growth.12 This underplays the
key role in policy making that the frictionless approach has assigned to the NRU.
Fourth, the growth drivers play a significant role in explaining employment and
unemployment movements. It follows that policies fostering growth are relevant for the
labor market performance. For example, Karanassou Sala and Snower (2003, 2004) find
that the rise in working-age population and the decline in capital formation is crucial in
understanding the EU unemployment experience of the 1970s and 1980s, while Bande
and Karanassou (2006) assert the importance of capital stock in explaining the Spanish
labor market performance. It is worth noting that the role of capital accumulation is
being increasingly acknowledged in the literature (see, among others, Rowthorn, 1999,
Karanassou and Snower, 2004, Kauppi, Koskela and Stenbacka, 2004, Kapadia, 2005,
and Blanchard, 2005 and 2006.)
Next, to explain the prolonged adjustment view we depart from a simple static labor
market model which is first used to characterize the frictionless equilibrium view.13
3 The Frictionless Equilibrium View
In what follows we consider a static frictionless equilibrium model that reflects the
view of basic microeconomic theory, where labor is considered the variable factor that
12See Karanassou and Snower (1997), and Karanassou, Sala and Salvador (2006).
13Recall that, in addition to a static labor market model, the frictionless equilibrium view is also
manifested in dynamic single-equation unemployment rate models.
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adjusts in the short run, and capital is the fixed factor that is constant in the short
run but adjusts in the long run. In short, basic micro theory ignores labor market
adjustment costs and thereby focuses on the frictionless equilibrium of this market. In
this equilibrium, there is no tendency for the participants in the labor market to change
their behavior, given the exogenous variables they face in each period of time. In this
static view of labor market activity, there are no labor market adjustment costs, and
thus the associated labor market equilibrium is a frictionless equilibrium.
Our model consists of three building blocks: first, a labor demand function, which
specifies how much labor all firms are willing to employ, given the real wage and other
variables; second, a labor supply function, which describes how much labor all house-
holds are willing to provide, given the real wage and other variables; third, a wage
setting function, which indicates the real wage that is set, given the employment level
and other variables. The labor demand function is derived from the profit-maximizing
employment decisions of the firms. The labor supply function is derived from the indi-
vidual decisions of households. The wage setting function may be the outcome of wage
bargaining, union decisions, efficiency wage considerations by firms, and so on.
3.1 Labor Demand
Consider a labor market containing a fixed number F of identical firms with monopoly
power in the product market. The i’th firm has a production function of the form
qSi,t = An
α
i,tk
1−α
i,t , (1)
where qSi,t is output supplied, ni,t is employment, ki,t is capital stock, A is a positive
constant, and 0 < α < 1. Each firm faces a product demand function of the form
qDi,t =
µ
Pi,t
Pt
¶−η yt
F
, (2)
where yt stands for aggregate real product demand, Pi,t is the price charged by firm i, Pt
is the aggregate price level, and η is the price elasticity of product demand (a positive
constant). All firms are assumed to face symmetric production and cost conditions.
Each firm set its employment at the profit maximizing level, at which the marginal
revenue from producing an extra unit of output is equal to the corresponding marginal
cost (for a given capital stock). The marginal revenue is MRi,t = Pi,t
³
1− 1η
´
. The
marginal cost beMCi,t =Wi,t
³
∂ni,t
∂qi,t
´
, whereWi,t is the nominal wage paid by the firm,
∂ni,t
∂qi,t
is the marginal labor requirement (the inverse of the marginal product of labor).
By the production function (1), the marginal labor requirement is ∂ni,t∂qi,t =
1
Aα
³
ni,t
ki,t
´1−α
.
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Setting the marginal revenue equal to the marginal cost, we obtain the firm’s labor
demand function:
ni,t = An
µ
Wi,t
Pi,t
¶− 1
1−α
ki,t,
where An =
h
Aα
³
1− 1η
´i 1
1−α
.
In the labor market equilibrium, Pi,t = Pt and Wi,t = Wt, due to symmetry across
firms. Define aggregate employment as Nt = Fni,t, the aggregate capital stock as
Kt = Fki,t (recalling that there is a fixed number F of identical firms), and the aggregate
real wage as wt =Wt/Pt. Aggregating across firms, we obtain the aggregate employment
function:
Nt = Anw
− 1
1−α
t Kt. (3)
This labor demand function is pictured in Figure 1 below.
3.2 Labor Supply
For simplicity, we assume the available work is divided equally among all workers in the
economy. Let St be the number of workers at time t. Furthermore, let the disutility of
work rise with the amount of work done. Specifically, let us express the disutility of work
of a representative worker as14 et = (Nt/St)
1/b, where Nt is aggregate employment.
The reservation wage is defined as the wage at which a worker is indifferent between
employment and unemployment. Thus the reservation wage is
rt = (Nt/St)
1/b . (4)
Equation (4) may also be interpretted as a labor supply curve:
Lt = Stw
b
t , (5)
i.e. at the wage wt, the amount of labor the workers are willing to supply is Lt. This
labor supply curve is pictured in Figure 1 below.
3.3 Wage Determination
Let the wage be the outcome of a bargaining process between the employers and their
employees, and the relative bargaining strengths of the bargaining parties could be any-
where between complete monopsony power for the employers and complete monopoly
power for the employees. This approach turns out to be quite general. When employers
14Since work is divided equally among all workers, an increase in aggregate employment Nt means
more work done by each worker.
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have complete monopsony power (viz., the employees exert no influence on the wage),
then our model can easily be modified to encompass the standard models in which the
wage depends on the reservation wage, but may be set beneath the reservation wage
(as in the standard monopsony models) or above it (as in the efficiency wage models).
In a perfectly competitive labor market, the wage is equal to the reservation wage and
the wage setting function, derived below, coincides with the labor supply curve. When
employees have complete monopoly power (viz., the employers have no influence on the
wage), our model can be modified to encompass the standard monopoly union models
in which the wage depends primarily on productivity, but the wage is above the mar-
ginal product of labor. Of course our model can also portray a variety of bargaining
outcomes between these extremes.
To fix ideas, suppose that wage determination is given by a Nash bargaining process
between each employer and his marginal employee. Then the wage may be specified
as a convex combination between two terms: (i) an “employee power” term, specifying
the wage that the employee would receive if she had complete bargaining power, and
(ii) an “employer power” term, showing the wage that would arise if the employer had
complete power. For simplicity, suppose that the fall-back positions of the bargaining
parties are zero. Then the employee power term is the marginal revenue product of
labor (i.e. if the employee had complete power, then she would capture all the revenue
from her employment activity), and the employer power term is the reservation wage
(i.e. if the employers had complete power, then he would drive the wage down to the
minimum level the worker was prepared to accept).
Recall that the firm’s real marginal revenue product of labor is
³
1− 1η
´
∂qi,t
∂ni,t
=³
1− 1η
´
Aα (ki,t/ni,t)
1−α. Since all firms are identical, and since aggregate employment
is Nt = Fni,t and Kt = Fki,t, this marginal revenue product may be expressed as³
1− 1η
´
∂qi,t
∂ni,t
=
³
1− 1η
´
Aα (Kt/Nt)
1−α. Furthermore, the reservation wage is given by
rt = (Nt/St)
b (equation (4)). Thus, the negotiated wage may be expressed as follows:
wt = µ
∙µ
1− 1
η
¶
Aα (Kt/Nt)
1−α
¸
+ (1− µ) (Nt/St)1/b (6)
where µ (0 ≤ µ ≤ 1) stands for the bargaining strength of the employee relative to the
employer.
Hence, the negotiated wage depends on two variables:
• the capital-employment ratio (Kt/Nt): as this ratio increases, the marginal prod-
uct of labor rises, driving up the negotiated wage (insofar as the employee has
bargaining power), and
• the employment rate (Nt/St): as this ratio increases, the disutility of work rises,
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driving up the reservation wage and thus also the negotiated wage (in connection
with the employer’s bargaining power).
In Figure 1 this wage setting curve is depicted by the dashed line WS, pictured
alongside the associated labor supply curve LS. Observe that, unless employers have
complete bargaining power (µ = 0), the wage setting curve will be flatter than the labor
supply curve. The reason is that when employees have some power, the reservation
wage effect is weaker (since (1− µ) < 1) and an increase in employment also reduces
the marginal production of labor. When employment isNt = St, the reservation wage is
equal to the negotiated wage (by equations (4)-(5)), and thus there is full employment.
Then the wage setting curve and the labor supply curve coincide.
In this figure the bargaining strength of the employer is sufficiently large relative
to that of the employee, so that the reservation wage effect dominates the marginal
product effect, and thus the wage setting curve slopes upwards.
The equilibrium position of the labor market may be depicted by the intersection
of the labor demand curve and the wage setting curve, denoted by point E in Figure 1.
At this point, the employment decisions made by the firms (at the prevailing real wage)
are consistent with the wage setting decisions made in bargaining (at the prevailing
employment level). The equilibrium real wage is denoted by w∗t and the equilibrium
employment level by N∗t in the figure.
The difference between labor supply (L∗t ) and labor demand (N
∗
t ) at the equilibrium
real wage is the equilibrium unemployment level (U∗t ). Since all labor market decisions
are assumed to be made in the absence of adjustment costs, this is the frictionless
equilibrium view of labor market activity.
3.4 A Log Linearized Model
In what is to follow, it will be convenient to work with a log-linearized version of this
labor market model.
Taking logarithms of the labor demand function (3), and letting Nt = log (Nt),
Kt = log (Kt), wt = log (wt), and introducing an error term εt ∼ i.i.d (0, σ2ε) (to be
interpretted below), we obtain the following aggregate employment equation:
Nt = a− awwt +Kt + εt, (7)
where
a = log (An) , and aw =
1
1− α.
We assume that the wage setters do not know the realization of the temporary shock
εt when they determine the wage (although they know the distribution of this shock).
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Figure 1: The Frictionless Labor Market Equilibrium
Log-linearizing the wage setting curve, we express the log of the negotiated wage as a
weighted average of an employee power term (related to the marginal product of labor,
which depends on Kt −Nt, the log of the capital-employment ratio) and an employer
power term (related to the reservation wage, which depends on Nt − Lt, the log of the
employment rate):
wt = c+ ce (Kt −Et−1Nt) + cf (Et−1Nt − Lt)
= c+ ceKt − cfLt + (cf − ce)Et−1Nt, (8)
where Lt is the log of labor supply, and Et−1 is the expectations operator (with expecta-
tions conditional on information in period t− 1), and ce and cf are the employee-power
and employer-power parameters, respectively (where the subscript e stands from “em-
ployee” and the subscript f stands for “firm”). Note that the slope of this wage setting
function in the wage-employment space depends on the relative magnitudes of these
two parameters.
By the employment equation (7) and the wage setting equation (8), we obtain the
expected equilibrium employment level Et−1N∗t and the equilibrium real wage w
∗, in
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terms of the equilibrium labor force and capital stock:
Et−1N∗t = a0 + akKt + (1− aK)L∗t (9)
w∗t = c0 + ck (Kt − L∗t ) , (10)
where
a0 = a− awc0, ak = 1− awc0,
c0 =
c+ a (cf − ce)
1 + aw (cf − ce)
, ck =
cf
1 + aw (cf − ce) .
By equation (5), the labor supply (in logarithms) is
Lt = St + bwt, (11)
where St is the log of the number of workers.
By this labor supply equation (11), the equilibrium wage is
w∗t =
c0
1 + bck
+
ck
1 + bck
(Kt − St) , (12)
the equilibrium labor force is
L∗t =
bc0
1 + bck
+
bck
1 + bck
Kt +
µ
1− bck
1 + bck
¶
St, (13)
and the expected equilibrium employment level is
Et−1N∗t =
µ
a0 +
(1− ak) bc0
1 + bck
¶
+
µ
ak +
(1− ak) bck
1 + bck
¶
Kt+
µ
1− ak −
(1− ak) bck
1 + bck
¶
St.
(14)
Finally, the unemployment rate ut may be approximated as the difference between
the log of the labor force Lt and the log of employment Nt:
ut = Lt −Nt. (15)
Thus, the expected equilibrium unemployment rate is15
Et−1ut = L∗t − Et−1N∗t .
15In much of the frictionless literature, the coefficients of the labor market equations are constrained
so that the level of the capital stock cannot affect the long-run equilibrium unemployment rate (see
Karanassou and Snower, 2004). For our model, the relevant restrictions would be dk = 0, i.e. either
ak = 0 or b = 0 or cf = ce.
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Figure 2: The Labor Market Equilibrium
Substitution of (13) and (14) into the above gives
Et−1ut = d0 − dk (Kt − St) , (16)
where
d0 = −a0 +
akbc0
1 + bck
, dk = ak
µ
1− bck
1 + bck
¶
.
The labor market equilibrium is pictured in Figure 2.
This model provides an underpinning for the simplest formulation of the natural
rate hypothesis, whereby the actual unemployment rate (ut) depends on the natural
rate of unemployment (un) and a strict white noise error term:
ut = un − t, (17)
where un = Et−1ut. It can be shown that the above iid error term t is a linear function
of the error term εt in eq. (7). Here the natural rate un may be interpretted as the
frictionless equilibrium unemployment rate.
The temporary labor demand shocks εt give rise to short-run variations in unemploy-
ment, whereas permanent shocks - such as changes in the capital stock, the labor force,
or the shift parameter of the production function - are responsible for the longer-term
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changes in the natural rate un.
4 The Prolonged Adjustment View
4.1 Unemployment Dynamics
We now take a first step toward the prolonged adjustment view by introducing a single
adjustment cost: a training cost that each firm must expend on new recruits in order
to make them productive contributors to its production process. We specify the firm’s
profit-maximizing employment decision in the same way as in the previous section,
except that now its marginal cost includes this training cost.
Specifically, let the marginal cost be MCi,t = Wi,t
³
∂ni,t
∂qi,t
´
ξi,t, where Wi,t is the
nominal wage paid by the firm, ∂ni,t∂qi,t is the marginal labor requirement, and the new
term is an employment adjustment parameter: ξi,t = (ni,t/σni,t−1)
δ, where δ is a training
cost coefficient (a positive constant) and σ is the employees’ “survival rate,” i.e. one
minus their separation rate.
For simplicity, we assume that the separation rate is sufficiently high (the survival
rate is sufficiently low), so that ni,t > σni,t−1. The employment adjustment parameter
may be interpreted in terms of training costs: ni,t/σni,t−1 = 1 + (hi,t/σni,t−1), where
hi,t is new hires. The training of new hires (hi,t) in period t is done by the incumbent
employees (σni,t−1) in that period. The greater the ratio of new hires to incumbent
employees, the greater the average training cost per employee (ξi,t). When δ = 0 (so
that ξi,t = 1), the employment adjustment cost is zero; and when δ > 0 (so that ξi,t > 1),
the adjustment cost is positive.
Recall that for the production function (1), the marginal labor requirement is
∂ni,t
∂qi,t
=
n1−αi,t
Aα k
−(1−a)
i,t , and thus the marginal cost is MCi,t =
Wi,t
αA n
1−α
i,t k
−(1−a)
i,t ξi,t. Set-
ting this marginal cost equal to the marginal revenue MRi,t = Pi,t
³
1− 1η
´
, we obtain
the following implicit labor demand function of the firm:
Wi,t
αA
n1−αi,t k
−(1−a)
i,t
µ
ni,t
σni,t−1
¶δ
= Pi,t
µ
1− 1
η
¶
. (18)
Once again, in the labor market equilibrium, Pi,t = Pt and Wi,t = Wt (on account
of symmetry). Aggregating across firms, taking logarithms, and introducing the strict
white noise error term εt ∼ iid (0, σ2ε) - to capture supply-side shocks (via technology)
or demand-side shocks (via the price elasticity) - we obtain the following aggregate
employment equation:
Nt = β + βnNt−1 − βwwt + βkKt + εt, (19)
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where β =
log(1− 1η )+log(αA)+δ log σ
1+δ−α , βn =
δ
1+δ−α , and βw =
1
1+δ−α , βk =
β
1+δ−α . As in the
previous section, Nt, wt, and Kt denote the logs of aggregate employment, real wage,
and aggregate capital stock, respectively.
The parameter βn will be called the employment inertia coefficient. When the
employment adjustment cost is zero (δ = 0), the employment inertia coefficient is zero;
when the adjustment cost is positive (δ > 0), the employment inertia coefficient is
positive as well.
Substituting the labor supply equation (11) into the wage setting equation (8), we
obtain the following wage equation
wt =
∙
c
1 + bcf
+
ce
1 + bcf
Kt −
cf
1 + bcf
St +
(cf − ce)
1 + bcf
Et−1Nt
¸
.
Substitution of the above into (19) gives the following employment dynamics equation:
Nt = φ0 + φnNt−1 + φkKt + φsSt + εt, (20)
where
φ0 =
β (1 + bcf)− βwc
1 + bcf + βw (cf − ce)
, φn =
βn
1 + bcf + βw (cf − ce)
,
φk =
βk (1 + bcf)− βwce
1 + bcf + βw (cf − ce)
, φs =
βwcf
1 + bcf + βw (cf − ce)
.
Substituting the wage setting equation (8) into the labor supply equation (11), we
obtain the following labor supply equation:
Lt = θ0 + θnNt + θkKt + θsSt, (21)
where
θ0 =
bc
1 + bcf
, θn =
b (cf − ce)
1 + bcf
, θk =
bce
1 + bcf
, θs =
1
1 + bcf
.
Next, let B denote the backshift operator, and rewrite (20) and (21) as
(1− φnB)Nt = φ0 + φkKt + φsSt + εt, (22)
(1− φnB)Lt = (1− φnB) (θ0 + θnNt + θkKt + θsSt) , (23)
respectively. Finally, substitute (22) and (23) into (15) to obtain the following unem-
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Figure 3: Unemployment Dynamics
ployment dynamics equation:
ut = [θ0 (1− φn)− φ0 (1− θn)] + φnut−1 (24)
+ [θk (1− φnB)− φk (1− θn)]Kt
+ [θs (1− φnB)− φs (1− θn)]St − (1− θn) εt
This equation is illustrated by the UD line in Figure 3 (where UD stands for “unem-
ployment dynamics”). Here the degree of autocorrelation (φn) measures unemployment
inertia.
If the unemployment rate is u0 in the initial time period t = 0, then the period-
1 unemployment rate will be u1, at the period-1 equilibrium point E1. In period 2
the unemployment rate will be u2 at the equilibrium point E2, and so on, until the
unemployment rate eventually attains its long-run equilibrium value of uLR at the long-
run equilibrium point ELR.
4.2 Unemployment Persistence
In the model above, unemployment displays inertia due to the costs of employment
adjustment. Under these circumstances, temporary labor market shocks have prolonged
after-effects on the unemployment rate.
Suppose, for example, that at time t = 0 the labor market is in an initial long-run
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Figure 4: Unemployment Persistence
equilibrium given by point E0 in Figure 4. Then, in period 1, a temporary adverse shock
occurs, which shifts the unemployment dynamics line upwards from UD0 to UD1 for one
period. Consequently the unemployment rate rises from u0 to u1, corresponding to the
period-1 equilibrium point E1. Thereafter the shock disappears and the unemployment
dynamics line shifts back down to UD0.
So, in period 2 the unemployment rate falls to u2 (corresponding to equilibrium
point E2). In this way, it continues to fall by smaller and smaller amounts from one
period to the next, as it approaches its original equilibrium value of u0 again.
Thus a temporary shock continues to affect the unemployment rate for a long time
after the shock has disappeared. This phenomenon is called unemployment persistence.
It is easy to see that the degree of unemployment persistence depends on the slope
of the unemployment dynamics line, i.e the unemployment inertia coefficient
φn =
βn
1 + bcf + βw (cf − ce)
=
δ
[1 + bcf + βw (cf − ce)] (1− α+ δ)
. (25)
Recall that δ is the employment adjustment cost parameter (positive), α is the elas-
ticity of production with respect to employment (positive), b is the wage elasticity of
labor supply, βw is the wage elasticity of labor demand, and cf (ce) is the employers’
(employees’) bargaining power (positive). That is, the unemployment inertia coefficient
depends
• positively on the training cost coefficient (δ),
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Figure 5: Different Degrees of Unemployment Persistence
• positively on the elasticity of production with respect to employment (α),
• negatively on the employers’ bargaining strength parameter (cf),
• positively on the employees’ bargaining strength parameter (ce), and
• negatively on the wage elasticities of labor demand and supply (βw and b, respec-
tively) when these are positive.
A stable long-run equilibrium of the labor market exists when 0 < φn < 1.
16 The
greater is the unemployment inertia coefficient φn, the longer it takes for unemployment
to return into the neighborhood of its original position, for a labor market shock of given
magnitude. In other words, the steeper the unemployment dynamics line, the greater
is the degree of unemployment persistence. This is illustrated in Figure 5.
In this figure we compare two economies that are alike in all respects except that
one has a higher degree of unemployment persistence than the other. Both economies
are initially at the equilibrium point E0, but one economy has a flat unemployment
dynamics line (UD0) whereas the other has a steep one (UD00). Then both economies
are hit by a temporary adverse shock of equal magnitude, so that both unemployment
dynamics lines shift upward by an equal vertical amount. Thus in period 1 the new
equilibrium is at point E1. Thereafter the shock disappears, so that both unemployment
dynamics lines return to their original positions.
16Generally, the AR(1) model is dynamically stable when |φn| < 1. However, it is plausible to
assume that unemployment is positively autocorrelated.
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The economy with the small unemployment inertia coefficient (the flat unemploy-
ment dynamics line UD0) then proceeds to point E2 in period 2, point E3 in period
3, and so on, towards the original equilibrium position E0. By contrast, the economy
with the large inertia coefficient (the steep unemployment dynamics line UD00) moves to
point E02 and then to E
0
3, and so on, also towards point E0. Comparing these two time
paths, it is obvious that the economy with the larger unemployment inertia coefficient
will take longer to reach any given neighborhood of the initial equilibrium, illustrated
by the circle around the initial equilibrium E0. In short, the greater the unemployment
inertia coefficient, the greater is the degree of unemployment persistence.
4.3 The Hysteresis View
Now suppose that
α = 1 and βw (cf − ce) = −bcf (26)
so that the unemployment autocorrelation coefficient is unity, φn = 1 (by equation
(25)). Furthermore, suppose that
0 = −φ0 (1− θn) + [θk (1−B)− φk (1− θn)]Kt
+ [θs (1−B)− φs (1− θn)]St (27)
Then the unemployment dynamics equation (24) becomes:
ut = ut−1 − (1− θn) εt (28)
Thus the current expected unemployment rate is equal to last period’s unemployment
rate:
Et−1ut = ut−1
In other words, the unemployment rate tends to get stuck at wherever it has been, so
that last period’s unemployment rate is the best predictor of the current unemployment
rate. This phenomenon is hysteresis.
It is illustrated in Figure 6. Here we consider an initial unemployment dynamics
line for which the realized value of the error term is εt = 0, so that
ut = ut−1
Thus the initial unemployment dynamics line UD0 coincides with the 450 line. This
means that every unemployment rate is a long-run equilibrium. Given that the initial
unemployment rate is u0, the long-run equilibrium is given by point E0, so that, in the
absence of any shocks, there is no tendency for this unemployment rate to change.
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Figure 6: Hysteresis
Now suppose that there is an adverse temporary shock, lasting for one period.
Specifically, in period 1 the unemployment dynamics line shifts from UD0 to UD1, and
then returns to UD0 in subsequent periods. In response to this shock, the equilibrium
point moves from E0 to E1 in period 1, and the unemployment rate rises from u0 to u1.
Once the unemployment dynamics line shifts back to UD0 in period 2, the equilib-
rium point moves to E2. In the absence of further shocks, it will remain there. The
associated unemployment rate remains at u1.
In short, in the presence of hysteresis, a temporary labor market shock has perma-
nent after-effects.
The problems with the hysteresis view are immediately apparent from the preceding
analysis. First, the condition (26), guaranteeing that the unemployment autocorrelation
coefficient is unity, can only hold by accident. For example, there is no reason why the
employers’ and employees’ bargaining power coefficients (cf and ce) should bear any
particular relation to the wage elasticities of labor demand and supply (βw and b).
Second, when the unemployment autocorrelation coefficient is unity and the error
term εt in the unemployment dynamics equation is white noise, the unemployment rate
follows a random walk. This has the counterfactual implication that the unemployment
rate hits 100 or zero percent with certainty in finite time.
And third, the hysteresis view relies on the counterfactual assumption that the
unemployment rate is not subject to permanent shocks, since permanent shocks lead to
explosive labor market behavior. Suppose, for example, that the economy was initially
at the equilibrium point E0, on the unemployment dynamics line UD0 in Figure 6, and
then a permanent adverse shock occurred, so that the unemployment dynamics line
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Figure 7: Effects of a Permanent Shock under Hysteresis
shifted permanently to UD1. As result, as shown in Figure 7, the equilibrium would
shift to point E1 in period 1, and from there to E2 in period 2, and so on, until the
unemployment rate hit 100 percent.
These deficiencies call the hysteresis view into question.
4.4 Imperfect Unemployment Responsiveness
We now return to our assumption of dynamic stability where the unemployment in-
ertia coefficient lies between zero and unity: 0 < φn < 1. Having seen that, under
these circumstances, temporary shocks have prolonged after-effects, we now turn to the
unemployment repercussions of permanent shocks.
Specifically, suppose that the economy is initially (at time t = 0) at the long-run
equilibrium point E0 in Figure 8. Then a permanent shock occurs in period 1, so that
the unemployment dynamics line shifts permanently upwards from UD0 to UD1. Thus,
in period 1, the economy moves to point E1, and the associated unemployment rate
rises from u0 to u1. In the following period, the economy moves to point E2, and
unemployment increases to u2. The unemployment rate continues to rise gradually in
this way, by smaller and smaller amounts in each successive time period, as the economy
approaches its new long-term equilibrium ELR.
In short, some of the unemployment effects from a permanent shock are delayed.
It can take a long time before the full effects of the shock have manifested themselves.
This phenomenon we call imperfect unemployment responsiveness.
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Figure 8: Imperfect Unemployment Responsiveness
The degree of imperfect responsiveness again depends on the size of the unem-
ployment inertia coefficient φn. The greater this coefficient, the longer it takes for a
given fraction of the unemployment effects of a permanent shock to have manifested
themselves - or, equivalently, the longer it takes for the unemployment rate to reach
a specified neighborhood of its new long-run equilibrium. In other words, the steeper
the unemployment dynamics lines, the more under-responsive is unemployment. This
is shown in Figure 9.
As in the case of unemployment persistence, we compare two economies that are
alike in all respects except that one has a greater unemployment inertia coefficient than
the other. Both economies are initially at the equilibrium point E0, and are then both
hit by a permanent shock of equal magnitude. Thus the unemployment dynamics line
of one economy shifts from UD0 to UD1, whereas the unemployment dynamics line of
the other economy shifts from UD00 to UD
0
1. Thus, in period 1, both economies move
to point E1.
Thereafter, the economy with the relatively large unemployment inertia coefficient
proceeds to point E2 in period 2, point E3 in period 3, and so on, towards the new long-
run equilibrium positionELR. By contrast, the economy with the relatively small inertia
coefficient moves to point E02, and so on, also towards the long-run equilibrium point
E0LR. It is clear that, for the economy with the larger unemployment inertia coefficient,
it takes longer to reach any given neighborhood of the new long-run equilibrium. In
short, the greater the unemployment inertia coefficient, the greater is the degree of
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Figure 9: Different Degrees of Imperfect Unemployment Responsiveness
unemployment under-responsiveness.
Observe that, for the unemployment dynamics equation (24), the degree of unem-
ployment persistence is related to the degree of unemployment under-responsiveness.
The greater the unemployment inertia coefficient, the more prolonged are the after-
effects of a temporary shock and the more delayed are the after-effects of a permanent
shock. However, this relation only holds for first-order unemployment autoregressions.
Under more realistic circumstances - such as when there are more than one lagged labor
market adjustment process in operation - the unemployment dynamics equation are of
higher order, and then persistence and responsiveness are no longer in lock-step. On
this account, it will be useful to understand these two phenomena as quite separate by
using a chain reaction theory framework.
5 Concluding remarks
Current mainstream macroeconomic theory tends to be compartmentalized into two
largely independent areas: (i) short-run business cycles and (ii) long-run growth. In
macro labor analysis this distinction is central to the natural rate of unemployment and
NAIRU theories, in which unemployment is decomposed into two components, “struc-
tural” and “cyclical” unemployment. The prolonged adjustment view moves beyond
this compartmentalization and shows how short, medium, and long runs are interre-
lated, merging with one another along an intertemporal continuum.
It is tempting to understand the prolonged adjustment view as simply occupying an
intermediate position between the frictionless equilibrium approach and the hysteresis
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approach. It is certainly true that, (i) in the frictionless equilibrium approach, cyclical
variations in unemployment are independent of structural variations, (ii) in the hys-
teresis approach, all cyclical variations are structural in the sense that all temporary
shocks have permanent unemployment effects, and (iii), in the chain reaction approach,
cyclical unemployment variations can have prolonged after-effects.
But this characterization puts the prolonged adjustment view into a Procrustean
bed, focusing our attention primarily on its most trivial, least interesting features. It is
like telling a painter that there are three groups of colors: white, black, and the range
of tones in between. This is true, but uninformative, since the range of intermediate
tones is where most of the action is. Placing the prolonged adjustment view between
the frictionless equilibrium and hysteresis views is similarly uninformative, since the
prolonged adjustments cover a wide diversity of phenomena, which had best be given
explicit, individual attention rather than being sandwiched between the other two views.
In explaining the movements of employment and unemployment, it is where most of
the action is.
References
[1] Bande R, Karanassou M (2006) Labour market flexibility and regional unemployment
rate dynamics: Spain 1980-1995. Queen Mary Working Paper 574, University of London.
[2] Berndt ER, Fuss M (1986) Productivity measurement with adjustments for variations in
capacity utilization and other forms of temporary equilibrium. Journal of Econometrics
33 (2): 7-29.
[3] Blanchard OJ, Summers L (1986) Hysteresis and the European Unemployment Problem.
NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1: 15-71.
[4] Blanchard OJ, Fischer S (1989) Lectures on Macroeconomics, The MIT Press, Cam-
bridge: MA.
[5] Blanchard OJ and Wolfers J (2000) The role of shocks and institutions in the rise of
European unemployment: the aggregate evidence. The Economic Journal 110 (462):
C1-C33.
[6] Blanchard O (2006) European unemployment: the evolution of facts and ideas. Economic
Policy 45: 5-59.
[7] Flodén M (2006) Labour supply and saving under uncertainty. The Economic Journal
116: 721-737.
[8] French E (2005) The effects of health, wealth, and wages on labour supply and retirement
behaviour. The Review of Economic Studies 72 (2): 395-427.
[9] Grubb D (1994) Unemployment and related welfare benefits. OECD Jobs Study, Chapter
8, Paris: OECD.
[10] Henry B, Karanassou M, Snower DJ (2000) Adjustment dynamics and the natural rate:
an account of UK unemployment. Oxford Economic Papers 52: 178-203.
30
                                    CREAP2006-15
[11] Kapadia S (2005) The capital stock and equilibrium unemployment: a new theoreti-
cal perspective. Discussion Paper Series 181, Department of Economics, University of
Oxford.
[12] Karanassou M, Snower DJ (1996) Explaining disparities in unemployment dynamics.
In: Baldassari M, Paganetto L, Phelps ES (eds) The 1990’s slump: causes and cures.
Macmillan Press (also published in Rivista di Politica Economica, 1993, 2: 37-62).
[13] Karanassou M, Snower DJ (1997) Is the natural rate a reference point?. European Eco-
nomic Review, 41, pp. 559-569.
[14] Karanassou M, Snower DJ (1998) How labor market flexibility affects unemployment:
long-term implications of the chain reaction theory. The Economic Journal 108: 832-849.
[15] Karanassou M, Snower DJ (2004) Unemployment invariance. German Economic Review
5 (3): 297-317.
[16] Karanassou M, Sala H, Snower DJ (2003) Unemployment in the European Union: a
dynamic reappraisal. Economic Modelling 20 (2): 237-273.
[17] Karanassou M, Sala H, Snower DJ (2004) Unemployment in the European Union: insti-
tutions, prices and growth. CESifo Working Paper Series 1247, Munich.
[18] Karanassou M, Sala H, Snower DJ (2006) Phillips curves and unemployment dynamics:
a critique and a holistic perspective. IZA Discussion Paper 2265, Bonn.
[19] Kauppi H, Koskela E, Stenbacka R (2004) Equilibrium unemployment and capital inten-
sity under product and labor market imperfections, HECER Discussion Paper 24.
[20] Layard R, Bean C (1989) Why does unemployment persist? Scandinavian Journal of
Economics 91: 371-396.
[21] Layard PRJ, Nickell SJ, Jackman R (1991) Unemployment: macroeconomic performance
and the labor market. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[22] Lindbeck A (1994): The welfare state and the employment problem. American Economic
Review, Papers and Proceedings 84 (2): 71-75.
[23] Lindbeck A, Snower DJ (1987a) Union activity, unemployment persistence, and wage-
employment ratchets. European Economic Review 31: 157-167.
[24] Lindbeck A, Snower DJ (1987b) Strike and lock-out threats and fiscal policy. Oxford
Economic Papers 39: 760-784.
[25] Lindbeck A, Snower DJ (1988) Cooperation, harassment, and involuntary unemploy-
ment. American Economic Review 78 (1): 167-188.
[26] Nickell SJ (1978) Fixed costs, employment and labour demand over the cycle. Economica
46: 329-345.
[27] Oswald AJ (1998) The missing piece of the unemployment puzzle. Paper presented at
CEPR/ESRC Workshop on ‘Unemployment Dynamics’, London, 4 th November 1998.
[28] Phelps ES (1994) Structural slumps: the modern equilibrium theory of unemployment,
interest and assets. Harvard University Press, Cambridge: MA.
[29] Phelps ES, Zoega G (2001) Structural booms: productivity expectations and asset val-
uations. Economic Policy 32: 85-126.
31
                                    CREAP2006-15
[30] Raurich X, Sala H, Sorolla V (2006) Unemployment, growth and fiscal policy: new
insights on the hysteresis hypotheses. Macroeconomic Dynamics 10 (3): 285-316.
[31] Romer, D (2006) Advanced Macroeconomics, 3rd Edition, MacGraw-Hill.
[32] Rowthorn R (1999) Unemployment,wage bargaining and capital-labour substitution.
Cambridge Journal of Economics 23: 413-425.
[33] Taylor JB (1979) Staggered wage setting in a macro model. American Economic Review
69: 108-113.
[34] Taylor JB (1980) Aggregate dynamics and staggered contracts. Journal of Political Econ-
omy 88 (1): 1-23.
32
                                    CREAP2006-15
 
SÈRIE DE DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL DEL CREAP 
 
 
 
 
2006 
 
 
CREAP2006-01 
Matas, A. (GEAP); Raymond, J.Ll. (GEAP) 
"Economic development and changes in car ownership patterns"  
(Juny 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-02 
Trillas, F. (IEB); Montolio, D. (IEB); Duch, N. (IEB) 
"Productive efficiency and regulatory reform: The case of Vehicle Inspection Services"  
(Setembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-03 
Bel, G. (GPRE); Fageda, X. (GPRE) 
"Factors explaining local privatization: A meta-regression analysis"  
(Octubre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-04 
Fernàndez-Villadangos, L. (GPRE) 
"Are two-part tariffs efficient when consumers plan ahead?: An empirical study"  
(Octubre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-05 
Artís, M. (AQR); Ramos, R. (AQR); Suriñach, J. (AQR) 
"Job losses, outsourcing and relocation: Empirical evidence using microdata"  
(Octubre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-06 
Alcañiz, M. (RISC); Costa, A.; Guillén, M. (RISC); Luna, C.; Rovira, C. 
"Calculation of the variance in surveys of the economic climate”  
(Novembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-07 
Albalate, D. (GPRE) 
"Lowering blood alcohol content levels to save lives: The European Experience”  
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-08 
Garrido, A. (IEB); Arqué, P. (IEB) 
“The choice of banking firm: Are the interest rate a significant criteria?”  
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
 
SÈRIE DE DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL DEL CREAP 
 
 
 
 
2006 
 
 
CREAP2006-09 
Segarra, A. (GRIT); Teruel-Carrizosa, M. (GRIT) 
"Productivity growth and competition in spanish manufacturing firms: 
What has happened in recent years?” 
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-10 
Andonova, V.; Díaz-Serrano, Luis. (CREB) 
"Political institutions and the development of telecommunications” 
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-11 
Raymond, J.L.(GEAP); Roig, J.L.. (GEAP) 
"Capital humano: un análisis comparativo Catalunya-España” 
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-12 
Rodríguez, M.(CREB); Stoyanova, A. (CREB) 
"Changes in the demand for private medical insurance following a shift in tax incentives” 
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-13 
Royuela, V. (AQR-IREA); Lambiri, D.; Biagi, B.  
"Economía urbana y calidad de vida. Una revisión del  estado del conocimiento en España” 
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-14 
Camarero, M.; Carrion-i-Silvestre, J.LL. (AQR-IREA).;Tamarit, C.  
"New evidence of the real interest rate parity for OECD countries using panel unit root tests with breaks” 
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-15 
Karanassou, M.; Sala, H. (GEAP).;Snower , D. J.  
"The macroeconomics of the labor market: Three fundamental views” 
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
creap@pcb.ub.es 
